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Handling a User’s Preferences on Permissions Required by an Application Software 
 
Abstract: 
This publication describes an operating system (OS) that uses a privacy layer for handling 
a user’s preferences on permissions required by an application software (application).  The privacy 
layer injects mock data into application programming interface (API) calls when the application 
requests a permission-protected resource.  As described herein, a permission-protected resource 
may include user data (e.g., calendar, contacts data, notes, user-biometric data) and access to user 
equipment (UE) hardware (e.g., gyroscopes, magnetometers, barometers, global navigation 
satellite system (GNSS) technology, proximity sensors, touchscreen sensors, biometric sensors, 
heart-rate sensors, thermometers, humidity sensors, radar technology, cameras, microphones) that 
the user does not want to grant access to the application.  The OS gives the user the choice to 
enable the privacy layer for each application or enable the privacy layer across the OS.  This 
privacy layer protects the user’s privacy and allows the user to utilize the application without 
sharing information that the user wants to keep private. 
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Background: 
Operating system (OS) developers, application software (application) developers, 
application software markets (application markets), and user equipment (UE) manufacturers 
increasingly offer users more product features.  A widely-used UE, such as a smartphone, enables 
the user to call, participate in a video-conferencing session, text, email, bank, invest, shop, search 
for information, consume several types of media, participate in social networking, play games, 
navigate to a location, and use a plethora of other applications.  In addition, UE manufacturers 
often integrate accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, barometers, global navigation satellite 
system (GNSS) technology (e.g., global positioning satellite (GPS)), proximity sensors, 
touchscreen sensors, biometric sensors, heart-rate sensors, thermometers, humidity sensors, radar 
technology, cameras, microphones, and various other sensors in or on the UE, which enhance the 
user experience and may play a role on the functionality of various applications.  Furthermore, the 
OS, the application market, the UE, and applications help manage user data, such as contacts data, 
short message service (SMS) data, notes, calendar data, user biometric data (e.g., fingerprint data, 
voice recognition data), credit card numbers, and other user specific data, which may also play a 
role on the functionality of various applications. 
When the user installs an application, the application may request permissions to access 
user data (e.g., calendar) and certain UE hardware (e.g., microphones, cameras, GNSS, 
accelerometers).  Figure 1 illustrates how the OS may prompt the user to accept or deny permission 
requests by an application when the user installs an application downloaded from the application 
market. 
3




Assume Jane downloads a voice over internet protocol (VoIP) application software called 
VoIP Service X.  Jane’s friends are increasingly using VoIP Service X, and Jane wants to start using 
it to stay in touch with her friends.  Also, assume Jane is aware that VoIP Service X allows users 
to make calls, send messages, track each-other’s location, and communicate using video-
conferencing sessions.  As Jane downloads VoIP Service X, the OS and the application market let 
her know that this application requests permission to access her contacts data, her location, the 
UE’s speaker, the UE’s microphone, and the UE’s camera, as illustrated in Figure 1.  Jane 
understands that VoIP Service X requests permissions to access her contacts data, the speaker, the 
microphone, and the camera, and her location, because VoIP Service X supports features that 
require access to the requested permissions.  Jane may be thinking, “I wish I can use VoIP Service 
X without granting access to my exact GNSS-tracked location because all I want to do is call, send 
messages, and participate in video-conferencing sessions.”   
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The example VoIP Service X application, however, requires Jane to grant access to the user 
data and the UE features illustrated in Figure 1 before Jane can start using the application because 
part of the appeal of VoIP Service X, is for friends to keep track of each other when they are 
attending a busy event, such as downtown on a Friday night, in a concert, Oktoberfest, and so forth.  
Jane, like many other users, decides to avoid using VoIP Service X due to the required permissions 
upon installation or usage.  Jane, however, can see the value that VoIP Service X can provide to 
her social life.  Therefore, it is desirable to have a technological solution that enables users to 
install and use applications while protecting their privacy. 
 
Description: 
This publication describes an operating system (OS) that uses a privacy layer for handling 
a user’s preferences on permissions required by an application software (application).  The privacy 
layer injects mock data (e.g., simulated, modified, truncated, pre-recorded, fake, noise) into the 
system application programming interface (API) calls when the application requests a permission-
protected resource.  As described herein, a permission-protected resource may be user data (e.g., 
calendar, contacts data, notes, user-biometric data) and user equipment (UE) hardware (e.g., 
gyroscopes, magnetometers, barometers, global-positioning system (GPS) technology, proximity 
sensors, touchscreen sensors, biometric sensors, heart-rate sensors, thermometers, humidity 
sensors, radar technology, cameras, microphones) that the user does not want to grant access to 
the application. 
The OS gives the user the choice to enable the privacy layer for each application under an 
easily-accessible user setting.  The user controls which permission-protected resource they want 
the privacy layer to protect.  The OS may inform the application when the user chooses to protect 
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access to certain user data and hardware.  At this stage, the user, the OS, and the application are 
aware that certain data may be mock data in order for the user to utilize application features and 
protect the user’s privacy.  If, however, an application developer refuses to allow the user to use 
the application when the privacy layer is enabled for reasons that are not clear to the OS or the 
user, the OS may make the use of the privacy layer opaque (instead of transparent) to the 
application.   
The OS supplies mock data on a case-by-case basis.  For example, a navigation application 
requires exact GNSS-tracked location in order for the user to safely use the application.  As another 
example, a racing game application requires real accelerometer-produced and gyroscope-produced 
data for the user to play the game.  In such cases, the OS does not give the user the choice to enable 
the privacy layer on access to user data and hardware that are required to use the application as 
intended.  The OS provides true data to the application when the real data is essential to use the 
application or the user has decided to grant the requested permissions.   
Recalling Jane’s example in Figure 1, the example VoIP Service X application requires 
Jane to grant permissions to access her contacts data, her location, the UE’s speaker, the UE’s 
microphone, and the UE’s camera.  The OS prompts Jane to select which permission-protected 
resource she wants the privacy layer to protect.  If Jane wants to protect her location, the privacy 
layer provides real data to the VoIP Service X application from the UE’s speaker, the UE’s 
microphone, and UE’s camera and provides mock data, such as Jane’s city or a fixed location in a 
larger vicinity (instead of her GNSS-tracked location).  If Jane wants to use VoIP Service X to only 
make and receive calls, the OS provides real data to only her contacts data, the UE’s speaker, and 
the UE’s microphone and provides mock data for her camera and her location.  
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In addition to the user’s choice to enable the privacy layer for each application, the user 
may choose to enable the privacy layer across the OS.  In that case, the OS uses the privacy layer 
depending on the features of each application.  To show how the privacy layer may work when 
enabled across the OS, consider the example illustrated in Figure 2. 
               
2A)  Social Media X                                              2B)  Navigation Application Y 
Figure 2 
 Assume Tom and Ben are on a road trip, and Tom is using his smartphone during the road 
trip.  Tom has enabled the privacy layer across the OS of the smartphone.  Tom and Ben have 
decided to leave their hometown, Geneva, Switzerland, to spend one night in Turin, Italy and a 
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few days in Milan, Italy.  As Tom and Ben get close to the border of France and Italy, they stop 
their car when they see Mont Blanc — the highest and the most famous mountain of the Alps.  
Tom decides to take a photo and posts it in the Social Media X application, as illustrated in Figure 
2A.  The example Social Media X application requires users to grant permission to access their 
location before they can use the application.  The privacy layer, however, supplies a fake location 
in accordance with the user’s wishes because location is not an essential part of the Social Media 
X application’s functionality.  Differently said, the Social Media X application does not know 
Tom’s and Ben’s location unless Tom explicitly decides to share his GNSS-tracked location.   
As Tom and Ben drive from Geneva, through France, to Turin, they use a navigation 
application called Navigation Application Y, as illustrated in Figure 2B.  Given that the GNSS-
tracked location is essential to the Navigation Application Y functionality, the OS supplies real 
GNSS-tracked location to the Navigation Application Y application.  Therefore, the Navigation 
Application Y application knows Tom’s location, but the Social Media X application does not know 
Tom’s location even though both applications require Tom to grant access to his location.   
 In conclusion, the privacy layer for handling a user’s preferences on permissions to access 
user data and hardware required by an application protects the user’s privacy and allows the user 
to utilize the application without sharing information that the user wants to keep private. 
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